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Audit chain integrity

Why the audit log gets its own page

For an IAM platform the audit log is the evidence behind every other control. If it is incomplete, late, or editable after the fact, everything built on it is weaker. This page states what AtmanID’s audit log guarantees and what it does not. Implementation detail is available under NDA through the Trust page.

What each record captures

Every privileged action writes an audit record with:

  • Who — the actor, and whether it was a person, an AI agent, or the system (scheduled jobs and API keys). The actor’s name and email are captured as they were at that moment, so a later rename does not rewrite history.
  • What — the kind of action and the thing it acted on.
  • Before and after — for changes, the state before and after, so a reviewer can see exactly what changed without reconstructing it from other data.
  • When — a timestamp set by the database, not by the application.
  • Which request — a request ID that is also returned to the caller, so one action can be followed from the caller’s own logs to the API usage record and the audit record. The audit API can be searched by request ID.
  • For AI-assisted actions — the user the agent acted for, and whether the action was confirmed by a click or ran under a time-limited standing authorisation.

Append-only

The application’s database login cannot update, delete or truncate audit records, so even a compromised application credential cannot rewrite or erase history. The only sanctioned change is redaction of personal data for an erasure request, which runs through a separate path and is itself recorded.

Every record carries a hash version. In current records (version 3) the personal fields — actor, target, delegating user, IP address, user agent, and the before and after state — enter the hash as salted commitments rather than as values. An erasure replaces those values and deletes their salts, so the chain still verifies while the erased values can no longer be confirmed by guessing. Older records are redacted the same way; the verifier excuses them only where a later, chained erasure event lists them.

Tamper evidence

Each tenant’s audit records form a hash chain: every record carries a sequence number and a cryptographic hash that covers its own contents and the previous record’s hash. Records can only be added through a single database function that keeps each tenant’s chain in order, and the database rejects any record that does not carry a hash.

As a result:

  • Changing a past record breaks its hash and every hash after it.
  • Removing a record leaves a gap in the sequence.
  • Rewriting history wholesale — recomputing every hash — is caught by signed checkpoints. Every few minutes the latest position of each tenant’s chain is signed with a key the database never holds, and the signature is stored both in the database and outside our database provider. Someone with full control of the database could recompute hashes but could not forge matching signatures.

The chain is re-verified regularly:

  • Nightly, the most recent records of every tenant’s chain are checked.
  • Weekly, every tenant’s full history is checked from its first record, along with every signed checkpoint.
  • On demand, administrators can check up to the latest 10,000 records from the Audit Log page.

A failed check records an audit event, raises an in-app alert, and sends a webhook your SIEM or on-call tooling can act on.

One caveat: records written before the hash chain was introduced (before March 2026) carry sequence numbers but no hash. The verifier reports them as unchained rather than as verified. Every record written since is chained.

Getting audit data out

  • SIEM export. Audit events can be exported to Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, QRadar or a custom endpoint, as CEF, LEEF or JSON. Export runs every five minutes and resumes from where the last export stopped, so a missed run does not leave a gap.
  • API. The audit API is scoped to the calling key’s tenant and can be filtered by time, actor, action and request ID.
  • Evidence packs. The Compliance Hub generates an evidence pack from the audit log for a chosen period, for use in audits.

Keeping coverage complete

An automated check runs before every push and in CI, and fails any change that adds a data-changing API route without an audit write (or a recorded, reviewed exemption). Action names follow a fixed naming convention so the record stays searchable by category.

Retention

Audit records are not deleted by age while a tenant is active. Each tenant sets an audit retention period between one and seven years (two by default), which governs how long its audit trail is kept after the account is closed.

What this design does not provide

  • Retention beyond seven years. Customers who need longer retention need an archive arrangement — for example, keeping the SIEM export.
  • Customer deletion of audit records. Customers cannot delete their own audit records, by design: a feature that lets an account erase its own trail is an evasion route.
  • Per-tenant encryption keys. Audit data is encrypted at rest with platform-managed keys, not a key per tenant. Customer-managed keys are on the roadmap.
  • Customer-visible operator access logs. AtmanID’s operator has production database access for operations. That access is not yet logged in a form customers can review; this is on the roadmap. The append-only protection and the signed checkpoints above still apply to it.

Adjacent reading

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