Personas
AtmanID is multi-persona by design — different humans (and now agents) interact with the platform through different surfaces and for different reasons. Understanding which persona is on which surface clarifies why features look the way they do.
The platform recognizes eleven built-in roles. Each persona below maps to one of those roles + a representative example from the smoke-test seed identities (Sarah Chen, Priya Singh, Marcus, etc.) used throughout the documentation.
Sarah Chen — the daily operator (identity_admin)
Sarah is the security engineer or IAM administrator who lives in AtmanID for several hours a day. Her jobs-to-be-done:
- Provision new users when they join, deprovision when they leave
- Investigate access requests that need her judgment (most are auto-routed to managers)
- Run quarterly access certifications and chase down delinquent reviewers
- Investigate SoD violations as they fire
- Onboard new applications + connectors
- Respond to “Sarah, can you give me access to X” questions from across the org
- Be the human in the loop for high-risk Iris-mediated actions
Sarah’s primary surface is the AtmanID web app + Iris chat. She uses Iris constantly — to count, to filter, to look up, to take quick actions. Her favorite query is some variant of “show me everyone who hasn’t completed their certification reviews and tag their managers.”
Sarah’s tier in the RBAC model: identity_admin — full read on everything in her tenant and full write on lifecycle, access and governance. The security controls an admin must not switch off on themselves (MFA, session and SSO policy, break-glass, custom admin roles, API key policy) belong to tenant_owner, and the permission matrix itself to super_admin.
Dev Torres — the platform engineer (agent_engineer)
Dev is the platform engineer or developer who builds the AI agents and integrations that AtmanID governs. Her jobs-to-be-done:
- Register new AI agents (Slack bots, custom internal LLM agents, automation scripts)
- Define each agent’s capability scope (what tools/tables/actions it’s allowed to use)
- Set up rotation policies for agent credentials
- Investigate agent anomalies (unexpected behavior patterns, failed policy evaluations)
- Build SDK-based integrations that consume the AtmanID API for org-internal use cases
Dev’s primary surface is the API, the SDK (@atmanid/sdk), the agent management pages, and the developer-facing parts of Iris. She rarely uses the human-IAM surfaces (provisioning, certifications) — those aren’t her job. Her favorite query is “show me every action my agent took in the last 24 hours, grouped by capability” with a follow-up to investigate any anomaly count > 0.
Dev’s tier in the RBAC model: agent_engineer — full agent surface, identity surface for the agents she owns, no governance access.
Priya Singh — the CISO (ciso)
Priya is the Chief Information Security Officer or VP of Security who answers to the board. Her jobs-to-be-done:
- Get a real-time read on org’s IAM posture (how many open SoD violations, how many overdue certifications, how many privileged accounts, what’s the trend)
- Ensure compliance certifications stay current (SOC2, ISO 27001, sometimes SOX)
- Respond to incidents (privileged access misuse, insider threat indicators)
- Brief the audit committee quarterly on security posture
- Make budget decisions about IAM investment
Priya rarely takes administrative actions herself — she delegates execution to Sarah. Her primary surface is the executive dashboard + Iris (for ad-hoc questions during board prep) + the trust report (for compliance evidence). Her favorite query is “give me a one-page summary of our IAM risk posture this quarter.”
Priya’s tier: ciso — read across intelligence, risk, audit and compliance, with a short list of executive-level mutations (approving or rejecting access requests, accepting risk, issuing time-boxed auditor access).
Marcus / Taylor Brooks — the external auditor (external_auditor)
Marcus is the external auditor (a contractor from a Big Four firm or a specialized compliance consultancy) who needs to verify AtmanID is doing what it claims for SOC2 or ISO 27001 evidence. His jobs-to-be-done are scoped and time-limited:
- Pull evidence packs for a specific date range
- Verify the audit chain integrity (the tamper-evidence proof)
- Sample-check certification campaigns to verify they were actually completed (not rubber-stamped)
- Verify privileged access has documented business justification
- Generate a report he can hand back to his audit firm
Marcus’s primary surface is read-only views + the audit trail + the trust report endpoints. He has zero mutation capability. His favorite query is “verify the audit chain integrity for tenant X for date range Y to Z” — and the platform’s tamper-evident chain (per Architecture overview) makes this answer either “✅ chain intact” or “❌ chain broken at sequence N” — no ambiguity.
Marcus’s tier: external_auditor — read-only access that only works while he holds a time-boxed auditor grant (at most 90 days, revocable, issued by a compliance officer or CISO). The grant names which read scopes he gets — audit view, audit export, report export, compliance reports — so he sees what was explicitly shared for the engagement, not everything.
End user (manager / employee / approver)
The end user is anyone in the customer organization who isn’t on the security team — managers approving access requests for their reports, employees requesting access to apps they need, approvers in workflow chains. Their jobs-to-be-done are minimal:
- Submit access requests when needed
- Approve/reject requests routed to them as managers or app owners
- Complete certification reviews on schedule (this is the most-frustrating workflow because it’s quarterly and feels like busywork)
- Look up “what access do I have” in their profile
End users rarely log into the full AtmanID web app. Their primary surface is email (request notifications, certification reminders) and Slack/Teams (notifications in-channel; in Slack, a lightweight approve button). The full app exists for them as a fallback. Their favorite Iris query — to the extent they use Iris at all — is “what apps do I have access to?”
End user tier: end_user — read-only on their own data, mutation only on request submission and approval workflow tasks routed to them.
The AI agent (NHI / autonomous capability)
This is the persona that doesn’t exist in legacy IAM tools. An AI agent is a non-human identity (a Slack bot, a Cursor sidebar agent, a custom LLM-powered automation) that takes actions on behalf of humans. Its jobs-to-be-done:
- Authenticate to AtmanID via API key or OAuth credential (agent tokens can be DPoP-bound to the agent’s own key)
- Call MCP tools through the AtmanID gateway, which checks every call against the agent’s token scope and policy
- Invoke specific capabilities scoped by its registration (the capability catalog)
- Request just-in-time access elevation for one-off privileged operations (with HITL gating)
- Emit telemetry that humans can monitor for anomalies
Each agent has:
- A registered identity with an explicit owner (a human responsible for it)
- A capability catalog defining exactly what it can do (no implicit capabilities)
- A credential rotation interval
- An anomaly-detection profile that flags behavior outside the expected envelope
- A revocation path (one click in the UI; one API call from the SDK)
Agents are first-class identities in the data model. They appear in the audit log (as actor_type='agent'), in access certifications (Marcus the auditor reviews agent access just like human access), and in incident response (revoking a misbehaving agent is the same kind of action as revoking a misbehaving human’s access).
Agent “tier” — agents don’t have human RBAC tiers; they have capability scopes declared at registration time. The capability catalog is the agent equivalent of RBAC.
Sam Rivera — the break-glass admin (super_admin)
Sam is the rarely-used break-glass identity. Her jobs-to-be-done are emergency-only:
- Recover from a P0 incident where normal RBAC chains can’t act (the identity_admin’s account is compromised, the CISO is unavailable, the platform itself needs admin intervention)
- Authorize platform-level changes that no other role can (the permission matrix, platform settings)
Sam’s tier: super_admin — full unrestricted write access. Every action she takes writes to the audit log like anyone else’s, and break-glass activation needs approval from another super admin, who is emailed the request. Frequent super_admin usage is itself an anomaly worth investigating.
How the personas overlap
In smaller organizations, one human plays multiple personas — the security engineer is also the CISO is also the platform engineer. AtmanID supports this via the role assignment model (one user can have multiple roles). The persona model is a frame for thinking about jobs-to-be-done, not a rigid org chart.
The eleven built-in roles:
super_admin(Sam)tenant_owner(the organisation’s accountable owner: everythingidentity_admincan do plus the security controls)identity_admin(Sarah)pam_admin(privileged access: vault entries and service identities)compliance_officer(a hybrid of Priya + Marcus, sometimes a separate hire in larger orgs)security_analyst(Priya’s deputy in larger orgs)ciso(Priya)agent_engineer(Dev)external_auditor(Marcus)manager(end-user with approval routing)end_user(everyone else)
Plus the agent capability surface for non-human identities.
Where to go next
- For the technical model that supports all these persona surfaces: Architecture overview
- For the natural-language interface every persona uses: Iris explained
- For step-by-step recipes scoped per persona: Guides
- For end-to-end scenarios like “onboard your first app and run a certification campaign”: Tutorials
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