RBAC architecture
AtmanID uses role-based access control. Each user holds one or more roles; each role is allowed or denied each action. This page describes the guarantees. Implementation detail is available under NDA through the Trust page.
Permissions are per tenant and live-editable
Every tenant has its own permission table: for each role and each action, allowed or not. A tenant’s identity administrators change it from the Permission Matrix in the product, and the change takes effect within about a minute — no deploy, no support ticket. Tenants can also define custom roles with their own combination of permissions.
Every request is checked
- Every API route checks that the caller is signed in and that one of their roles allows the action, before it reads or changes anything.
- Every product page is mapped to a permission, so a user does not see pages they cannot use. Automated checks fail any change that adds a page without a permission mapping, maps a page to a permission no role can hold, or changes how an existing API route authenticates.
- Pages hide what a role cannot do as a convenience; the server-side check is what actually enforces it.
What happens if the permission store is unreachable
Availability and safety are traded off deliberately:
- Reads fall back to the platform’s default permissions, so people can keep viewing data during a brief database problem. Those defaults can be broader than permissions a tenant has tightened.
- Writes are refused once loading the tenant’s permissions has failed repeatedly, rather than being decided by the defaults.
What is recorded
Role assignments and removals, changes to the Permission Matrix, and refusals made by the central policy check are written to the tamper-evident audit log. Refusals are useful evidence for access-control reviews and for spotting someone probing what they can reach.
Roles
AtmanID ships standard roles for the common jobs — platform administration, the organisation’s accountable owner, day-to-day identity administration, privileged-access administration, security leadership, security analysts (read-only), compliance, managers who approve and review their team’s access, external audit (read-only and time-limited), engineers who register AI agents, and end users who view their own access and request more. Tenants assign these or define their own.
What this design does not do
- Attribute-based rules. Access is decided by role, not by attributes such as department. Custom roles are the workaround; they scale poorly with many departments.
- Cross-tenant roles. A role applies within one tenant only.
- Relationship-based authorization. Delegation chains and per-resource relationships (Zanzibar-style) are a long-term direction, not a current capability.
Adjacent reading
- Multi-tenancy isolation — the tenant boundary underneath every permission check
- Audit chain integrity — how permission changes and refusals are recorded
- Threat model — elevation-of-privilege threats
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