Set up an external auditor for SOC 2 evidence collection
What you’ll do
You’re Sarah Chen, compliance_officer at Acme Corp. Your CFO just sent: “Big Four audit firm starts SOC 2 Type 2 fieldwork on Monday. Marcus from EY needs read-only access to our IAM controls evidence.” Today the answer is “I’ll export some screenshots and audit log CSVs to a shared drive.” After this tutorial, the answer is “Marcus has read-only access through a time-boxed grant that expires on its own, an evidence pack with a SHA-256 fingerprint, and an audit trail he can verify himself.”
This tutorial walks the complete external-auditor onboarding loop — Sarah’s setup work, Marcus’s access experience, the evidence pack contents, the chain integrity verification, and the engagement closeout. You’ll do both perspectives so you understand what the auditor sees and what they CAN’T do.
If you’re new to the persona model, read Concepts → Personas first — Marcus’s external_auditor role is fundamentally different from any internal AtmanID user role and the differences matter for how this flow works.
Prerequisites
- An AtmanID tenant where you hold the
compliance_officer,cisoorsuper_adminrole — only these roles can issue auditor grants - The auditor’s contact info: full name, email, the firm they’re from (e.g., Marcus Brooks, marcus.brooks@ey.com, Ernst & Young)
- The audit engagement scope: which controls (e.g., SOC 2 CC6.6 logical access, CC7.2 system monitoring), which date range (typically 6-12 months for SOC 2 Type 2)
- A signed NDA between Acme Corp and the audit firm. AtmanID does not provide an NDA or click-through acknowledgment flow — keep the legal NDA on file outside the product.
Step 1 — Give Marcus the external_auditor role
Marcus needs a user account that holds the external_auditor platform role:
- If Marcus doesn’t have an account yet, create one from Identity & Access → Directory with New Identity (name Marcus Brooks, email marcus.brooks@ey.com).
- Open Platform Config → Administration → Platform roles, click the external auditor role card, choose Add User, and search for Marcus.
The external_auditor role is fundamentally different from internal roles in two ways worth understanding before Marcus arrives:
- Read-only everywhere. The role can view and export — audit trail, directory, SoD violations, certifications, compliance posture — but it cannot approve, revoke or change policy. No action that mutates state is granted to
external_auditor. - No standing access. Holding the role isn’t enough: Marcus acts only while he holds a valid, unexpired auditor grant (Step 2), and only within its scopes. Without one, exports return a 403 and the role is taken off his session (see No standing access for the warn phase this ships in).
Step 2 — Issue Marcus a time-boxed auditor grant
Navigate to Security & Risk → Compliance → Auditor access (the Auditor Access Grants page) and click Issue grant. Fill in:
- External auditor: Marcus Brooks (only active
external_auditorusers in your tenant appear here) - Scopes: tick what the engagement needs — Audit View (the Auditor Portal), Audit Export, Report Export (generating evidence packs) and Compliance Report
- Access window: 1 hour, 8 hours, 24 hours, 7 days, 30 days or 90 days. 90 days is the maximum — pick the shortest window that covers fieldwork
- Reason (optional):
EY SOC 2 Type 2 — H1 2026 fieldwork
Click Issue grant. AtmanID writes AUDITOR_GRANT_ISSUED to the audit log with Marcus’s id, the scopes, the expiry and your reason. The grant appears in the table with its status and expiry.
Step 3 — Generate the SOC 2 evidence pack
Evidence packs are the unit of “stuff we’ve shown the auditor.” Each pack covers a date range and a framework, and carries a SHA-256 fingerprint of its contents.
Navigate to Security & Risk → Compliance → Evidence packs. Under Generate New Evidence Pack, fill in:
- Period Start: 2025-12-01
- Period End: 2026-05-31 (the 6-month operational evidence window)
- Framework: SOC 2 (TSC) — CC6 logical access, CC7 monitoring activity, CC8 change management and NHI scope (CC6.6)
Click Generate Pack. AtmanID:
- Queries the evidence sources for the period — access reviews, SoD violations, identity lifecycle events, monitoring activity, NHI scope
- Assembles them into one pack, section by section
- Computes a SHA-256 hash of the pack contents and stores it in the pack’s metadata (so Marcus can verify nothing changed after delivery)
- Writes
EVIDENCE_PACK_GENERATEDto the audit log with the hash
When it finishes, use Download JSON for Marcus’s tools or Print / Save as PDF for the deliverable. Packs are generated on demand rather than stored, so send Marcus the downloaded files — or, since his grant includes Report Export, he can generate the same pack himself.
Step 4 — Marcus signs in (auditor experience)
(Switch perspective. You’re now experiencing this as Marcus.)
Marcus signs in and opens Security & Risk → Compliance → Auditor portal. He sees:
- Framework Posture and Compliance Frameworks — the control coverage summary
- Evidence Packs — when the last pack was generated, with a link to generate one
- Audit Resources — links to the Audit Log, SoD Violations and Certifications
Every visit writes AUDITOR_PORTAL_VIEWED with Marcus as the actor. Marcus’s experience is deliberately read-only: he can look and export, but he can’t approve, revoke or reconfigure anything.
Step 5 — Verify the audit chain integrity (Marcus’s job)
This is the most important step from Marcus’s perspective. He needs to verify the audit log isn’t tampered with — otherwise every SOC 2 control that depends on audit evidence is materially weaker.
The check is run from the Verify now button on the Audit trail page, which compliance officers and super admins can use. Marcus asks the compliance officer to run it while he watches (in person or on a shared screen), so he sees the result first-hand.
The platform walks the most recent hashed audit records (up to 10,000), recomputing each integrity_hash and checking that each record’s previous_hash matches the record before it. The result is one of:
- Audit chain intact — tamper-evident. All checked records verified, with the sequence range covered.
- Audit chain tampered — review immediately. The specific sequence number where a hash didn’t match. Auditor cannot proceed; this is a P0 finding.
- A chain gap, or benign historical rows noted — a break or known pre-fix records that are reported separately from tampering, so they can be reviewed rather than mistaken for it.
AtmanID’s audit log is append-only and hash-chained, with checkpoints signed outside the database (see Audit chain integrity). Marcus’s verification therefore rests on:
- The hash-chain walk above — any edit, deletion or forged insertion breaks recomputation from that point forward
- Scheduled re-verification that tells tampering apart from a gap or a known pre-chain record
- Cross-table consistency: API usage records and audit records share a request ID, so tampering on one is detectable by joining to the other
- One documented limitation: records written before the chain was introduced (before March 2026) carry no hash and are reported as unchained historical records, not as verified
This honest accounting matters: Marcus knows exactly what the chain proves and where its limits are.
Step 6 — Per-control evidence review
For each SOC 2 control in scope, Marcus works from the evidence pack sections and the audit trail. These are the questions he typically answers:
CC6.6 — Logical access controls:
For tenant Acme Corp, date range 2025-12-01 to 2026-05-31:- Show every access grant- Show every access revocation- Show distribution by approval workflow- Show any access granted without an audit row (should be zero)CC7.2 — System monitoring:
- Show every privileged action, by actor- Show the distribution of action types over the period- Show every denied action (RBAC blocks), with its reasonCC7.5 — Anomaly detection:
- Show every action by users marked SUSPENDED or DEACTIVATED (should be zero post-deactivation)CC8.1 — Change management:
- Show every configuration change, with who made it- Show before/after state for each change (from the audit API, which returns the previous state)Comparisons are Marcus’s own analysis, not something AtmanID computes for him: a user whose privileged activity spiked against earlier periods, activity at unusual hours, or activity from a new IP address. He pulls the records for the periods he wants from the audit API — which returns the IP address where it was recorded — and compares them in his own tools.
These are not saved one-click queries. On Security & Risk → Audit & Forensics → Audit trail, Marcus narrows the log with Search, Category, Actor Type, From and To, and expands a row to see the state recorded with the event. Export CSV saves the rows on screen (one page, up to 50). For a whole period, the previous state of a change or the IP address, he uses the audit API (API-key scope read:audit_logs), which returns them where they were recorded — see Navigate the audit trail.
Step 7 — Engagement closeout (Sarah’s job)
When the access window ends, Marcus’s exports stop on his next request and the External Auditor role comes off his session within a few minutes; a daily job records AUDITOR_GRANT_EXPIRED. Sarah doesn’t need to do anything for that part.
If the engagement changes:
- Extension: grants can’t be edited. Issue Marcus a new grant with the new window (Step 2); the new grant writes its own
AUDITOR_GRANT_ISSUED. - Early termination: on Auditor Access Grants, click Revoke on Marcus’s grant. Access ends immediately and AtmanID writes
AUDITOR_GRANT_REVOKED.
Expiry and revocation end the grant, which ends what the role can open; the role assignment itself stays. When the engagement is over, also remove Marcus from the external auditor role in Platform roles (or deactivate his account) so his account holds nothing it no longer needs. His engagement’s audit records are retained per your organisation’s audit retention setting (between one and seven years; two by default).
Step 8 — Verify the engagement audit trail
Sarah verifies the engagement end to end from the audit API (a key with the read:audit_logs scope) — everything Marcus did in the portal is attributed to him:
curl -s "$ATMANID_BASE_URL/api/v1/audit?actor_email=marcus.brooks%40ey.com&since=2026-04-01T00:00:00Z" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATMANID_API_KEY"Expected output: each AUDITOR_PORTAL_VIEWED while he worked, and any EVIDENCE_PACK_GENERATED he ran himself. The grant records are attributed to the people (or the scheduled job) that wrote them — Sarah for AUDITOR_GRANT_ISSUED and AUDITOR_GRANT_REVOKED, the system for AUDITOR_GRANT_EXPIRED — so query those with action_type instead, for example ?action_type=AUDITOR_GRANT_ISSUED&since=2026-04-01T00:00:00Z.
This corpus is the proof of how the engagement actually went — when Marcus had access, what he opened, which packs were generated. If your CFO asks 6 months later “what did we share with EY in Q2 2026?” the answer is a query, not a memory of what was emailed.
What just happened
You converted “external auditor onboarding” from an ad-hoc shared-drive + email-trail mess into a structured engagement with:
- Read-only by role: Marcus’s role can view and export but cannot change anything
- Time-bounded access: the grant expires on its own, at most 90 days out — no forgotten standing access to the auditor workspace
- Self-service verification: Marcus runs his own audit chain integrity check, doesn’t need to trust your assertion
- Queryable engagement history: the audit query above replaces “did we share X with the auditor?” memory checks
- Fingerprinted evidence: every pack carries a SHA-256 hash recorded in the audit log, not a hand-curated PDF
This is the shape of every external engagement going forward — same flow whether it’s SOC 2, ISO 27001, SOX or a customer-driven security questionnaire. The first onboarding takes ~25 min; subsequent engagements take ~10 min once your team has the muscle memory.
Common pitfalls
- An access window longer than the fieldwork. The longest window is 90 days; for a 4-week engagement, pick 30 days and issue a new grant if fieldwork runs over.
- Missing scopes on the grant. Evidence packs need Report Export and Audit Export; the Auditor Portal needs Audit View. For a SOC 2 engagement tick all four.
- Forgetting the role after the grant ends. Expiry closes everything the role opens, but the assignment stays on the account until you remove it — tidy it up at closeout.
- Granting external_auditor any write permissions via custom role. The shipped
external_auditorrole carries no mutating permissions, but a custom role built to “help the auditor” can drift. Stick to the canonical role. - Not running the chain integrity check. Marcus reading the evidence pack without verifying the chain is rubber-stamping. Make it the first thing he does.
Going further
- For the engineering depth on how the audit chain provides the integrity guarantee, see Architecture → Audit chain integrity.
- For the broader Trust posture (subprocessors, certifications, security commitments), point Marcus at https://atmanid.com/trust.
- For more on Marcus’s persona — what makes external_auditor distinct from internal compliance roles — see Concepts → Personas → Marcus.
- For the certification campaign workflow that produces the underlying audit evidence Marcus is reviewing, see Onboard your first app and run a certification campaign.
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