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Threat model (STRIDE)

This page summarises, for each STRIDE threat class, what AtmanID guarantees and which risks it accepts. It deliberately leaves out component-level implementation detail; a full architecture pack is available to customers and prospects under NDA through the Trust page.

Trust boundaries

  1. Internet → application. All traffic is HTTPS. Every request after sign-in carries a signed session that is re-checked against the user’s current role and account status.
  2. Session → permission check. Every API route checks the caller’s permission for the action before touching data.
  3. Request → AI assistant (Iris). Iris acts with the signed-in user’s permissions. Actions that change access go through a confirmation step.
  4. Application → database. Every query runs under the caller’s tenant, and PostgreSQL Row-Level Security enforces it. See Multi-tenancy isolation.

S — Spoofing

Threat Controls Accepted risk
Stolen user credentials Each tenant sets which roles must use MFA. Once required, an enrolled user must pass MFA for every session; newly covered users get a short window to enrol. Passwords are stored as salted hashes. Roles a tenant has not put under its MFA policy can sign in with a password alone.
An unregistered script posing as a registered AI agent Agents must be registered and authenticate with their own credentials; tokens are checked on every tool call. A leaked agent secret stays valid until the customer rotates it.
Session theft HTTPS-only, HttpOnly session cookies; sessions expire and are re-validated against the user’s current status. A successful cross-site scripting attack against a signed-in user could use their session; a per-request nonce-based Content Security Policy reduces but does not remove this.

T — Tampering

Threat Controls Accepted risk
Editing or deleting audit records The audit log is append-only, enforced by database permissions, and hash-chained. The chain head is signed outside the database. Recent entries are re-verified nightly and the whole history weekly. See Audit chain integrity. Entries written before the hash chain was introduced are reported as unchained rather than verified.
Forged or altered access requests Requests follow defined approval workflows; every state change is recorded in the audit log with the before and after state. A compromised approver account can approve requests; the audit trail records it.
Script or styling injected through organisation branding Uploaded SVG logos and icons are parsed and rebuilt from an allowlist of elements and attributes; custom navigation icons are drawn only as CSS masks. Organisation themes are validated tokens rendered by the server — no customer-written CSS reaches the page. —
Prompt injection against Iris Iris answers from a catalogue of named tools and never writes SQL. Actions that grant, extend or re-route access always need an explicit confirmation showing values read from the database. Iris can still be steered into a wrong answer about the user’s own data, or into proposing an action the user then confirms.

R — Repudiation

Threat Controls Accepted risk
A user denies having taken an action Every action is recorded with the actor, the time, a request ID linking multi-step workflows, and the before and after state. Someone using stolen credentials is recorded as the account owner; MFA raises the bar but does not remove this.
Denying an Iris-assisted action Each Iris action records the user it ran for, the tool used, and whether it was confirmed by a click or run under a time-limited standing authorisation. As above.
Shared API keys Each call is recorded against the key that made it. Customers can share a key between people; AtmanID cannot prevent that.

I — Information disclosure

Threat Controls Accepted risk
One tenant reading another’s data Row-Level Security on every tenant table, a tenant context set from the session on every query, Iris queries built by the server on a read-only login, and automated checks against regressions. See Multi-tenancy isolation. Tenants are isolated logically in one database, not in separate infrastructure.
Connector credentials leaking Stored encrypted; never returned by the API after they are saved. Encryption keys are managed by the platform, not per tenant; customer-managed keys are on the roadmap.
Error messages revealing internals Clients receive a generic error code and message with a request ID; detail goes to server logs only. —

D — Denial of service

Threat Controls Accepted risk
Request floods Rate limits on every route that changes data and on sign-in, plus the hosting provider’s edge protection. A large distributed attack could still degrade service.
Expensive queries Every list is paginated and bounded; large tables are indexed for the queries the product runs. —
Driving up AI costs through Iris Bounded tool calls per question and rate limits on chat. Sustained abuse by an authenticated user is detected by monitoring, not blocked automatically.

E — Elevation of privilege

Threat Controls Accepted risk
A permissions bug exposing an action Permissions are stored per tenant and checked on every request; automated checks ensure every route maps to a permission. If the permission store cannot be reached, read access falls back to the platform’s default permissions, which can be broader than permissions a tenant has tightened; write access is refused after repeated failures.
Escalation through Iris Anything that grants, extends or re-routes access needs explicit confirmation. A user may let Iris run actions that only reduce access (revoke, reject) without asking each time, for a limited period. A user can be talked into confirming a harmful action; the audit trail records it.
A connector account with more access than AtmanID needs Connectors request only the scope AtmanID uses. If a customer grants the connector account broader rights, a compromise of AtmanID could misuse them.

Risks we accept today

  • Customer credential hygiene. AtmanID can require MFA for its own sign-in, but cannot stop customers sharing API keys or storing them insecurely.
  • Operator access. AtmanID’s operator has production database access for operations. That access is not yet logged in a form customers can review; separate, customer-visible logging of operator access is on the roadmap.
  • Supply chain. Dependencies are scanned for known vulnerabilities on every change and builds run in CI; builds are not yet produced by an attested (SLSA) pipeline.
  • Cloud provider security. Hosting and database providers are SOC 2 audited; AtmanID relies on their physical and infrastructure controls. On-premise deployment is not offered.

Adjacent reading

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