This page summarises, for each STRIDE threat class, what AtmanID guarantees and which risks it accepts. It deliberately leaves out component-level implementation detail; a full architecture pack is available to customers and prospects under NDA through the Trust page.
Trust boundaries
- Internet → application. All traffic is HTTPS. Every request after sign-in carries a signed session that is re-checked against the user’s current role and account status.
- Session → permission check. Every API route checks the caller’s permission for the action before touching data.
- Request → AI assistant (Iris). Iris acts with the signed-in user’s permissions. Actions that change access go through a confirmation step.
- Application → database. Every query runs under the caller’s tenant, and PostgreSQL Row-Level Security enforces it. See Multi-tenancy isolation.
S — Spoofing
| Threat |
Controls |
Accepted risk |
| Stolen user credentials |
Each tenant sets which roles must use MFA. Once required, an enrolled user must pass MFA for every session; newly covered users get a short window to enrol. Passwords are stored as salted hashes. |
Roles a tenant has not put under its MFA policy can sign in with a password alone. |
| An unregistered script posing as a registered AI agent |
Agents must be registered and authenticate with their own credentials; tokens are checked on every tool call. |
A leaked agent secret stays valid until the customer rotates it. |
| Session theft |
HTTPS-only, HttpOnly session cookies; sessions expire and are re-validated against the user’s current status. |
A successful cross-site scripting attack against a signed-in user could use their session; a per-request nonce-based Content Security Policy reduces but does not remove this. |
T — Tampering
| Threat |
Controls |
Accepted risk |
| Editing or deleting audit records |
The audit log is append-only, enforced by database permissions, and hash-chained. The chain head is signed outside the database. Recent entries are re-verified nightly and the whole history weekly. See Audit chain integrity. |
Entries written before the hash chain was introduced are reported as unchained rather than verified. |
| Forged or altered access requests |
Requests follow defined approval workflows; every state change is recorded in the audit log with the before and after state. |
A compromised approver account can approve requests; the audit trail records it. |
| Script or styling injected through organisation branding |
Uploaded SVG logos and icons are parsed and rebuilt from an allowlist of elements and attributes; custom navigation icons are drawn only as CSS masks. Organisation themes are validated tokens rendered by the server — no customer-written CSS reaches the page. |
— |
| Prompt injection against Iris |
Iris answers from a catalogue of named tools and never writes SQL. Actions that grant, extend or re-route access always need an explicit confirmation showing values read from the database. |
Iris can still be steered into a wrong answer about the user’s own data, or into proposing an action the user then confirms. |
R — Repudiation
| Threat |
Controls |
Accepted risk |
| A user denies having taken an action |
Every action is recorded with the actor, the time, a request ID linking multi-step workflows, and the before and after state. |
Someone using stolen credentials is recorded as the account owner; MFA raises the bar but does not remove this. |
| Denying an Iris-assisted action |
Each Iris action records the user it ran for, the tool used, and whether it was confirmed by a click or run under a time-limited standing authorisation. |
As above. |
| Shared API keys |
Each call is recorded against the key that made it. |
Customers can share a key between people; AtmanID cannot prevent that. |
| Threat |
Controls |
Accepted risk |
| One tenant reading another’s data |
Row-Level Security on every tenant table, a tenant context set from the session on every query, Iris queries built by the server on a read-only login, and automated checks against regressions. See Multi-tenancy isolation. |
Tenants are isolated logically in one database, not in separate infrastructure. |
| Connector credentials leaking |
Stored encrypted; never returned by the API after they are saved. |
Encryption keys are managed by the platform, not per tenant; customer-managed keys are on the roadmap. |
| Error messages revealing internals |
Clients receive a generic error code and message with a request ID; detail goes to server logs only. |
— |
D — Denial of service
| Threat |
Controls |
Accepted risk |
| Request floods |
Rate limits on every route that changes data and on sign-in, plus the hosting provider’s edge protection. |
A large distributed attack could still degrade service. |
| Expensive queries |
Every list is paginated and bounded; large tables are indexed for the queries the product runs. |
— |
| Driving up AI costs through Iris |
Bounded tool calls per question and rate limits on chat. |
Sustained abuse by an authenticated user is detected by monitoring, not blocked automatically. |
E — Elevation of privilege
| Threat |
Controls |
Accepted risk |
| A permissions bug exposing an action |
Permissions are stored per tenant and checked on every request; automated checks ensure every route maps to a permission. |
If the permission store cannot be reached, read access falls back to the platform’s default permissions, which can be broader than permissions a tenant has tightened; write access is refused after repeated failures. |
| Escalation through Iris |
Anything that grants, extends or re-routes access needs explicit confirmation. A user may let Iris run actions that only reduce access (revoke, reject) without asking each time, for a limited period. |
A user can be talked into confirming a harmful action; the audit trail records it. |
| A connector account with more access than AtmanID needs |
Connectors request only the scope AtmanID uses. |
If a customer grants the connector account broader rights, a compromise of AtmanID could misuse them. |
Risks we accept today
- Customer credential hygiene. AtmanID can require MFA for its own sign-in, but cannot stop customers sharing API keys or storing them insecurely.
- Operator access. AtmanID’s operator has production database access for operations. That access is not yet logged in a form customers can review; separate, customer-visible logging of operator access is on the roadmap.
- Supply chain. Dependencies are scanned for known vulnerabilities on every change and builds run in CI; builds are not yet produced by an attested (SLSA) pipeline.
- Cloud provider security. Hosting and database providers are SOC 2 audited; AtmanID relies on their physical and infrastructure controls. On-premise deployment is not offered.
Adjacent reading